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a  b  s t  r a  c t
This  paper focuses  on the  concept of patent  scope, and  contributes  to existing  research  in three  ways.  First,
it offers  a re-examination  of the  construct and  identifies two  dimensions  of patent scope, (1)  the number
of  variations  of the core  inventive  idea identified  in the patent, reflected  in the  number  of  claims  in the
patent (e.g.  Merges and  Nelson, 1994); and (2)  the positioning of those variations  in the  inventive  space,
which  is reflected in the  number  of technological  classes  in which  patent  examiners classify those claims.
Second, it  investigates  the  implications  of patent  scope for  the  firm’s  subsequent inventive  performance,
and  finds  that, when the  scope  of a patents  spans across a higher number  of technological classes, the
extent  to which  the  inventing firm  itself  succeeds  in building  on  the  knowledge  underlying its own
patent is lower. Third, it investigates  the  antecedents  of  scope, and suggests that  prior  investment  in
scientific knowledge  and in related  inventive  experience are  two  factors  that  affect  the  scope of the
patents  that  firms develop. The theoretical  predictions elaborated in this  paper  are  supported  by  an
empirical examination  of a  longitudinal sample  of firms  in the  photonics  industry.
© 2014 The Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier B.V. This is an open  access article  under  the  CC  BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Let us imagine the inventive space as a  space that holds all the
ideas that have already been created, as well as and those that have
yet to be generated. We can imagine that each invention occu-
pies a certain area within this inventive space, and its position
reflects the technological domain with which it is associated. In
such a characterization, we can think of a patent as the temporary
right to exclude others from making, using or selling an inven-
tion positioned in  that area of the inventive space in  exchange for
its eventual public disclosure (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; USPTO,
2014a). The possession of this right (at least in  principle) can allow
an inventor to appropriate the benefits generated from their inven-
tion (Kitch, 1977). However, it would have limited value if it did
not protect the inventor against mere variations to the original
idea (e.g., Scotchmer, 1991). The patent system addresses this con-
cern by allowing inventors to specify the patent’s ‘full scope’ (Kitch,
1977; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997; Levin et al., 1987; Merges
and Nelson, 1994; Walker, 1995).
Specifically, a  patent application is composed of two main
components. The first is  the specification of the invention, which
describes the techno-economic problem faced by the inventing
firm and provides a  “precise characterization of the ‘best mode’ of
∗ Tel.: +44 020 7040 0991; fax: +44 020 7040 8328.
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solving the problem” (Merges and Nelson, 1994,  p. 9). The second
is a set of claims, each of which specifies possible improvements or
variations that could be made to the patented invention to adapt
it for different uses (Merges and Nelson, 1994; Walker, 1995).
Consequently, it corresponds to an additional area of the inventive
space that the applicant claims should be protected by the patent.
For instance, the claim of an invention consisting of an electrical
component that contains magnetic particles and a  matrix of  fibers1
can specify that the magnetic particles can have a diameter ranging
from about 1 nm to about 10 m.2
The positioning of patent claims in  the inventive space can vary.
They can refer to marginal variations to the invention (e.g. the diam-
eter of a  component) or to more ‘diverse’ variations –  for instance,
to completely different materials of which the same component
1 This example is a  simplification based on an existing patent in the  field of pho-
tonics.
2 Patent claims have a similar role both in the context of product and process
innovation. In the first case they usually refer to variations to the invention’s com-
ponents, in the second usually refer to  variations to the process that would lead to
similar outcome(s). As the US  patent law prohibits ‘omnibus claims’, i.e.  those that
are  too general and do not provide clear guidelines as to  what would constitute an
infringement (Chiang, 2010; Walker, 1995),  inventors are incentivized to  specify
explicitly in the claims section the  potential variations to the invention that they
consider to  be part of the original invention (Walker, 1995). USPTO examiners also
verify that claims refer to “enabling”, “useful” and “operative” variations, in that
they  provide an  advantage in genuinely solving the problem(s) that the invention
addresses (Gambardella and Giarratana, 2013; USPTO, 2014a).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2014.09.005
0048-7333/© 2014 The Authors. Published by  Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC  BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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could be made to adapt the invention to multiple applications. In
spatial terms, if such alternatives were specified in the claims, the
latter would be more distantly positioned from the original inven-
tion than the former. In the US patent system, the positioning of
claims is captured by the technological classes to which the patent
is assigned. When the patent examiners scrutinize the applica-
tion documents, they attribute it to  one mandatory classification,
according to the class of the controlling patent claim, and then also
to a variable number of additional classes, if the additional claims
“fall” into other technological domains (USPTO, 2014b).
Building on these premises, this paper offers a re-examination
of the concept of patent scope from the perspective of an inventing
firm, identifying two dimensions to it: (1) the number of variations
to  the core inventive idea that are  identified in  the patent, which are
reflected in the number of its claims (e.g. Merges and Nelson, 1994);
and (2) the positioning of such variations in the inventive space,
which is reflected in the number of technological classes in  which
the patent examiners classify such claims. While patents can vary
along both dimensions, existing research has generally overlooked
this issue. This paper argues that  a  higher number of claims might
allow the inventing firm to build on its patented knowledge (e.g.
Hall et al., 2005; Kitch, 1977; Merges and Nelson, 1994); but, when
the patent claims are classified across multiple classes, the extent
to which the inventing firm is itself able to appropriate and build
on the knowledge underlying the patent may  decrease.
Having shown that both these dimensions are important in
affecting the strength of the protection a patent grants, this paper
addresses the following questions: What enables the identifica-
tion of a greater number of patent claims, and what determines
the positioning of such claims across a  greater number of tech-
nological domains? Surprisingly, there has been limited research
exploring the antecedents of patent scope. In this paper, I build
on research on the role of science in the inventive process (e.g.,
Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Narin, 1994; Narin et al., 1997)  and
on analogical processes (e.g. Gavetti et al., 2005; Gick and Holyoak,
1980; Hofstadter, 2001), and identify firms’ prior investments in
scientific knowledge and in  related inventive experience as two
factors affecting patent scope. The theoretical predictions elabo-
rated in this paper are  supported by an empirical examination of a
longitudinal sample of firms in the photonics industry.
The rest of the article is  organized as follows. In Section
2 I explore the concept of patent scope, its implications and
antecedents. In Sections 3 and 4,  I describe the empirical setting,
data, econometric specifications, estimation results, and in  Section
5 I discuss the paper’s contribution, implications for future research
and limitations.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Patent breadth, patent width and patent scope: prior
theoretical and empirical research
Using slightly different definitions, prior research has gener-
ally referred to the constructs of ‘patent breadth’, ‘patent width’
or ‘patent scope’ when referring to  the level of leniency used by the
regulator in granting exclusion rights to  patentees (e.g. Denicolo’,
1996; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Green and Scotchmer, 1995;
Klemperer, 1990; Matutes et al., 1996; Merges and Nelson, 1990,
1994; Scotchmer, 1991). Despite the value of these contributions,
existing research in this area overlooks some important issues.
First, most of it builds on the idea that – given a  certain degree of
leniency on the part of the regulator in  examining patent cases – an
inventing firm will take full advantage of it, for instance by specify-
ing in the patent claims all the possible variations to the invention
that the regulator is likely to permit. This requires assuming that
the full set of possible variations to  an invention is known to (or
could easily be identified by) the inventor at the time of the patent
application (i.e. Merges and Nelson, 1990, 1994). This paper relaxes
this assumption, in that  it suggests that the scope of a  patent is
also determined by firms’ ability to identify a  higher number of
variations. Because this ability likely varies across firms, this paper
explores the antecedents of this heterogeneity – which have not
been considered in most prior research.
Second, in  investigating the implications of patent scope, most
prior research has focused on its implications for social welfare
(e.g. Denicolo’, 1996; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Klemperer, 1990;
Merges and Nelson, 1990, 1994; Scotchmer, 1991). This paper
extends prior research by showing how the scope of patents affects
the extent to which the inventing firm is  able to build on its own
prior patents compared to  other firms.
Finally, existing research has not  provided precise guidance as
to  the operational interpretation of the construct of patent scope.
Some studies have suggested that the scope of a patent can be mea-
sured as the number of technological classes in which its claims are
classified (e.g. Lerner, 1994; Nerkar and Shane, 2003; Shane, 2001),
building on the idea that a  patent with broader scope would include
more distant applications. Reflecting, instead, the idea that a  patent
with a  broader scope covers a  greater number of variations to the
invention, other studies have measured the scope of a  patent as
the number of claims it includes (e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman,
1997). This paper extends prior research by recognizing that the
number of claims in  a  patent, and the number of classes in  which
those patent claims are classified reflect different dimensions of
the patent scope construct, and suggests that  its operationaliza-
tion should take both dimensions into account. Table 1 provides
a  synthesis of prior research on these issues, and compares the
assumptions and findings of prior studies.
2.2. The implications of patent scope
I  argue that both the number of a  patent’s claims and their
positioning across classes affect firms’ ability to appropriate the
‘inventive’ returns from their inventions. Prior literature in  this
area has emphasized that all patents embody the opportunity
for further development, and can act as a springboard for future
inventions (Ahuja et al., 2013; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Hall
et al., 2005; Kitch, 1977; Merges and Nelson, 1994; O’Donoghue,
1998; Scotchmer, 1991). Existing research has identified an associ-
ation between patents’ scope and the subsequent inventive activity
that builds on them, as measured by the number of ‘forward cita-
tions’ the patent receives (e.g. Lerner, 1994). However, this research
does not distinguish between citations received from subsequent
patents developed by the inventing firm itself (i.e. ‘self-citations’),
and those received from patents developed by others (i.e., ‘exter-
nal’ citations). While self-citations reflect the firm’s internalization
of the knowledge underlying its own inventions (Belenzon, 2012;
Hall et al., 2005; Trajtenberg, 2002), external citations indicate that
other players have internalized part of the knowledge underlying
the original invention and succeeded in  building on it. Hence, from
the standpoint of the inventing firm’s appropriability, the value of
self- and external citations differs substantially.
A  deep understanding of both the codified and tacit knowl-
edge elements underlying the patent should, in  principle, give
the original inventing firm an advantage in conceiving subsequent
developments more easily and more quickly than other firms (e.g.
Arora, 1996; Giarratana and Mariani, 2014; Katila and Ahuja, 2002).
A higher number of claims should act as a  deterrent to  other firms
from building on the knowledge underlying the patent, as it cor-
responds to  an increased probability that a  new invention in that
area might infringe at least one of the patent’s claims (Kitch, 1977;
Merges and Nelson, 1994; Scotchmer, 1991). It might also reflect
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Table 1
Literature overview.
Author(s), Year and
type of
contribution
Key construct relevant to this
paper
Perspective considered Assumptions about the
inventing firms’ incentives and
the sources of welfare loss
Characteristics of the inventive
process
Key findings
Klemperer (1990)
Theoretical
Patent width: extent of
similarity allowed by the
regulator between the  focal
invention and those developed
by other firms (“How similar a
drug should a competitor be
allowed to  sell?” p.  113)
Policy maker.
The objective is to  identify the
optimal patent policy (i.e. the
ideal combination of patent
width  and patent length) that
maximizes social welfare
accounting for the inventing
firm’s incentives
The inventing firm is
incentivized by the profits at
time t, which are defined as a
function of patent width. Firms
are only allowed to  choose
their prices as a function of
patent width, which is  set at
the system level
Welfare losses originate from
two  sources: 1. Consumption
switching to less preferred
product varieties;
2. Consumption switching out
from the product category
Innovative activity ceases after
one  patent is  awarded. Hence,
the inventing firm’s utility is
affected only by the profits
associated with the product
variety it produces (which
embodies the invention)
Even if increasing the width of
a  patent increases the
monopolistic power granted to
the inventing firm, greater
patent width may be the
optimal choice “if  for each
consumer the value of
consuming the preferred
variety is higher than the value
of consuming no variety of the
product by the same monetary
amount” (p.  115)
Gilbert and Shapiro
(1990)
Theoretical
Patent breadth: the flow rate of
profits available to the
patentee while the  patent is  in
force, which is  determined by
the regulator through various
policies (e.g. exclusive
territories, tying arrangements,
antitrust laws. . .).  In all cases
breadth translates into the
maximum price that the
patentee can charge for the
product that embodies the
invention
Policy maker.
The objective is to  identify the
optimal patent policy (i.e. the
ideal combination of patent
breadth and patent length)
that maximizes social welfare
accounting for the inventing
firm’s incentives
The inventing firm is
incentivized by profit at time t,
which corresponds to patent
breadth.
Welfare losses originate from
consumption that is  switched
out of the product category
Innovative activity ceases after
one  patent is  awarded and –
hence – the inventing firm’s
utility is  affected only by
profits associated with the
current invention
In a  homogenous good market,
the optimal policy involves
patents of infinite length
whenever increasing the
breadth of the patent is
increasingly costly – in terms
of deadweight loss
Denicolo’ (1996)
Theoretical
Patent breadth: defined by the
various instruments used by
the government to  limit the
extent of the monopoly the
inventing firm enjoys over a
new technology it has
developed (p.  249)
Policy maker.
The objective is to  optimize the
inventing firm’s incentives to
invent as well as social welfare.
It extends earlier literature to
the case in which many firms
race for a patent
Incentives are not only
determined by the profits
earned by  each patentee, but
also by  the profits earned by
non-innovators and by the
profits earned after the patent
expires.
In addition to being originated
by reductions in the level of
investment in R&D, social loss
also originates from
inefficiencies (i.e. duplication
of entry costs, inefficient
productions . . .)
The paper considers the  case of
a single invention rather than a
sequence of inventions
Narrowing patent breadth
leads to  more competition in
the product market; this
increases social welfare only to
the  extent that social welfare
increases more rapidly than the
incentives to innovate decrease
as the patent is narrowed. This
depends on  the nature of the
competition, which can be
more or less efficient. If
competition is  less efficient,
narrowing the breadth of the
patent increases the  output of
less efficient firms
Kitch (1977)
Theoretical
Patent scope: scope “accorded
by the patent system to the
inventing firm’s patent claims
(p. 267)
Policy maker Contrast between the reward
theory (i.e. patent system as a
device that enables an
inventing firm to capture the
returns from its investment in
the invention) and the prospect
theory (i.e. patent system as a
device used to  increase the
output from resources used for
technological innovation)
Innovative activity is
cumulative
Firms have different types of
knowledge and resources (p.
277) that they can apply in the
invention process. Contracting
can be used to  give different
parties different areas to
explore
Patents with a broad scope
should be granted to enable
inventing firms to  develop
their inventions that have a
potential for significant
improvement in an orderly
fashion
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Table 1 (Continued)
Author(s), Year and
type of
contribution
Key construct relevant to this
paper
Perspective considered Assumptions about the
inventing firms’ incentives and
the  sources of welfare loss
Characteristics of the inventive
process
Key findings
Scotchmer (1991),
Green and
Scotchmer
(1995)
Theoretical
Patent breadth: “Leniency of
the courts in interpreting the
novelty requirement of
patents” (Matutes et  al.,  1996,
p. 80). Compared to the first
order invention, increase in
quality required from a  second
order invention so that the
second invention does not
constitute an infringement
(Green and Scotchmer, 1995)
Policy maker.
The objective is to  investigate
the  use of patent protection
and cooperative agreements
among firms to protect
incentives for cumulative
research
The inventing firm is
incentivized by profits
generated through first- and
second-order inventions,
earned by  selling the  invention
as a product, or by licensing it
to  firms that have developed
products that infringe on the
focal  firms’ patent. Patent
breadth does  not change the
per-period joint profits (which
are fixed), but only their
division between sequential
inventing firms.
Social loss originates from
reductions in the level of
investment in R&D
Innovative activity is
sequential and inventions are
subject to  multiple stages of
modification and
improvement.
Firms  have different types of
expertise that allow them to
develop different applications
of  the first invention
Profit erosion due to invention
of  derivative improvements by
other firms may be mitigated
by increasing patent breadth or
by permitting cooperative
ex-ante agreements. However,
when there is  uncertainty
about the value of second order
inventions and cooperation is
permitted, the optimal breadth
can be finite
Merges and  Nelson
(1990, 1994),
Cohen and
Lemley (2001)
Theoretical
Patent scope: “allowed”
breadth of the patents claims,
as determined by the patent
policy
Policy maker.
The objective is to  determine
the  patent scope that does not
hinder technical progress
Profits are not exclusively a
function of the  breadth of the
patent, but also of superior
design, production and
marketing. Moreover, the
inventing firm has a  natural
advantage in terms of lead
time. In addition, increasing
breadth does  not necessarily
provide firms with incentives
to invent in the area protected
(i.e. firms sometimes “sit on
their monopoly positions”).
Social loss originates from
reductions in the level of
investment in R&D and from
the  consequent limitation of
technical progress
Technical advance is  sequential
and  connected and often
cumulative.
Heterogeneity in firms’
capabilities is  recognized,
especially in identifying “the
developmental opportunities
associated to  an invention”
(Merges and Nelson, 1994; p. 7)
The impact of the breadth of
patents on  subsequent
inventing in a field depends on
the  topography of technical
advantage in a  field,  i.e.
whether technical progress
requires diversity of
capabilities versus express
coordination. The case of the
software industry, studied by
Cohen and Lemley (2001),  is  an
example of an industry in
which patents of wide breadth
might be granted, but where
this is  unlikely to  promote
progress in the industry
Matutes et al.
(1996)
Theoretical
Patent Scope: leniency of the
courts in granting claims of
innovations that are not fully
developed
Policy maker.
The objective is to  identify the
ideal combination of patent
scope and patent length taking
into account both the
inventing firm’s incentives to
invent and social welfare
Inventing firms are
incentivized by the profits they
can make from the invention in
the  “patenting” and
“non-patenting” case. Without
the  patent, inventing firms
have incentives to wait before
they introduce the applications
developed on the basis of their
technology in order to avoid
imitation that  can  happen
through reverse engineering.
Social loss originates from
delay in the  diffusion of the
knowledge related to  the basic
innovation (i.e. delayed
disclosure)
Innovative activity is
cumulative. The knowledge
associated with the invention
is necessary to  develop further
innovations. The number of
applications that can be
derived from an invention is
part  of common knowledge
Scope generates higher levels
of  welfare than length because
it  anticipates the period during
which other firms can
introduce applications of their
own, and because patent
holders have more flexibility to
decide when to  exercise their
property rights
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Table 1 (Continued)
Author(s), Year and
type of
contribution
Key construct relevant to this
paper
Perspective considered Assumptions about the
inventing firms’ incentives and
the sources of welfare loss
Characteristics of the inventive
process
Key findings
Lerner (1994)
Empirical
Patent Scope: breadth of the
patent protection, represented
by the breadth of claims in
each  patent. Operationalized as
the number of technological
classes in which a  patent is
classified
Policy maker/inventing firm.
The purpose is  to empirically
examine the impact of patent
scope on a firm’s economic
value
By pioneering an empirical
investigation into the construct
of patent scope and its impact
on firms’ valuation, the paper
provides support for the
theoretical idea that the scope
of patents can exert a relevant
impact on the inventing firms’
incentives, as well as being an
important policy instrument
The paper reflects the
cumulative nature of the
invention process, in that it
investigates the  impact of the
scope of a  patent on the
subsequent (external) citations
it receives
Broader patent scope (patent
classes) is associated with
greater numbers of external
forward citations; greater
probability of litigation; higher
market valuation of the firm
Lanjouw and
Schankerman
(1997)
Empirical
Patent Scope: breadth of claims
in  each patent. Operationalized
as the number of claims
included in  a patent. Number of
patent classes included in the
analyses as a  control variable
Policy maker/inventing firm.
The purpose is  to identify the
factors that contribute to
patent litigation and
understand whether patent
litigation dilutes the incentives
provided by  the patent system
Not only the returns from
patenting but also its costs (e.g.
the potential costs of litigation)
affect the incentives to invent
The paper reflects the
cumulative nature of the
invention process, in that it
investigates the  impact of the
scope of a  patent on the
subsequent (external) citations
it receives, and on patent
litigation
Patents that are broader in
scope – in the sense that they
embody more claims – will be
more exposed to potential
infringement and thus
litigation. Patents that are
classified in a higher number of
classes are associated with a
lower probability of litigation
This  paper Patent scope refers to  the space
of  the exclusion right actually
covered by a patent.
The present paper extends prior
theoretical research in that: it
suggests that the actual area
covered by a patent also
depends on the inventing
firm’s ability to  identify
variations to  the core invention
and not  just on  the regulator’s
leniency.
The paper extends prior
theoretical and empirical
research in that  it recognizes
that  patent scope can  vary
along  two  distinct dimensions.
(1) The number of variations to
the core inventive idea
identified in the  patent,
reflected in the number of
claims in the patent (e.g.
Merges and Nelson, 1994); and
(2) the positioning of those
variations in the inventive
space,  which is  reflected in the
number of technological
classes in which those claims
are classified by patent
examiners
The present paper extends prior
research in that:
(1) It takes a firm (as opposed
to  a policy) perspective;
(2) it investigates the impact of
patent scope on firm’s ability
to build on  their patents
compared to other firms
(3) It explores the antecedents
of patent scope
The strength of protection
provided by  the patent varies
depending on both the number
of variations identified
(included in the patent claims)
and their positioning in the
inventive space (i.e. patent
classes) and it may  affect the
extent to  which the  inventing
firm will build on the patent
compared to  other firms
The present paper builds on
Cohen and Lemley (2001),
Green and Scotchmer (1995),
Kitch (1977),  Matutes et al.
(1996), Merges and Nelson
(1990, 1994); Scotchmer
(1991) in that:
(1) it recognizes that the
inventive activity does not
cease after the first invention,
but rather is cumulative or
sequential; and
(2) it recognizes that firms have
different types of knowledge
and  resources that they can
apply in the invention process.
This  paper extends these prior
studies in that it suggests that
firms’ heterogeneity can  also
affect the identification of
variations to  the core invention
that can  be included in the
patent claims (as opposed to
affecting only the development
of  subsequent inventions)
Holding other conditions
constant, the higher the
number of claims in  the patent
and the lower the number of
technological classes in which
a  patent’s claims are  classified,
the  greater the extent to  which
the  inventing firm will build on
it compared to other firms.
The greater the firm’s scientific
knowledge, the greater the
number of claims in  its patents
and the greater the number of
technological classes its patent
claims will be classified in.
The greater the firm’s related
inventive experience, the
greater the number of claims in
its  patents and the lower the
number of technological
classes its  patent claims will be
classified in
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the inventing firm’s strategic intention itself to reduce the likeli-
hood that others can invent in  the areas surrounding the patented
invention.
However, holding the number of claims in  a patent constant,
the strength of these mechanisms will be reduced if those claims
are positioned across multiple technological domains. In this case
the focal firm may  be less likely, compared to other firms, to  have
the internal capabilities or  complementary assets required to  pur-
sue developments of its invention across all potential domains (e.g.
Chang, 1995; Merges and Nelson, 1994; Penrose, 1959; Peteraf,
1993). In addition, the more dispersed the domains to  which an
invention contributes are, the more difficult it can be for the focal
firm to focus its attention across all of them (Ocasio, 1997) and the
less credible it can be that it will do so (Caves, 1984; Lieberman
and Montgomery, 1988). In fact, the inventing firm might have
developed the patent with a  broader technological span with the
intention of harvesting licensing revenues, rather than to  further
technological developments on all fronts itself (Gambardella et al.,
2007; Gans et al., 2008). Patents classified in more different classes
will also have greater visibility, and be more likely to ‘cross’ more
firms’ search processes. Hence, they will be more likely to be built
on by others. Thus:
Hypothesis 1. Holding other conditions constant, the extent to
which an inventing firm will build on its patent compared to other
firms increases with the number of patent claims but decreases
with the number of technological classes in  which the patent’s
claims are classified.
2.3. The antecedents of patent scope: scientific knowledge and
related inventive experience
Although many applications of an invention may  only emerge
over time (Cattani, 2005; Rosenberg, 1998), inventing firms are
incentivized to try to identify as many of these variations as possi-
ble to increase their pre-emptive advantage over their competitors
(Aljalian, 2005; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Chiang, 2010).3 This implies
thinking beyond the particular manifestation of its idea that the
inventing firm has currently conceived (Kitch, 1977; Merges and
Nelson, 1994). Hence, I  build on the assumption that the identifi-
cation of potential variants to an invention can be  facilitated by
the factors that enable the inventing firm to abstract from that
invention’s local context, and to scout for potential solutions – or
elements of such solutions – in different settings. I identify two fac-
tors that can lead to  this outcome, i.e.  the levels of a  firm’s scientific
knowledge and of related inventive experience in its knowledge
base.
2.3.1. Scientific knowledge and patent scope
Extant literature has suggested that science can alter the way
the invention search processes operate (e.g., Narin, 1994; Narin
et al., 1997; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). I  suggest it can also
lead to the development of a broader scope for patents by facili-
tating abstraction. First, scientific knowledge provides firms with a
repertoire of abstract principles derived from general theories and
laws (Arora and Gambardella, 1994a,b; Mowery, 1981; Rosenberg,
1990), and greater familiarity with these general principles facil-
itates the abstraction of new technological problems (Bresnahan
and Gambardella, 1998). Second, using scientific knowledge in the
invention process increases the likelihood that inventions are less
3 This statement has also found support in the qualitative evidence collected via
interviews conducted with patent attorneys as a complement to  this  study’s quan-
titative analysis. Specifically, interviewees confirmed that – within the boundaries
of what is reasonable to  claim in association with a  certain invention – inventing
firms  are generally incentivized to  identify the highest possible number of claims.
contextualized to  any specific application setting in their original
conception, being derived directly from abstract principles (Arora
and Gambardella, 1994b).
The conceptualization of technological problems in  abstract
terms fostered by science facilitates the navigation of the techno-
logical environment in multiple directions and the recombination
of different elements of identified solutions, and so further expands
the overall set of possible solutions to problems (Fleming and
Sorenson, 2004), i.e. the number of potential variations to  the core
inventive idea. This suggests that:
Hypothesis 2a. The greater the firm’s scientific knowledge, the
greater the number of claims in  its patents.
The use of scientific knowledge in  the invention process can
also lead to the identification of more distant variations to the
invention. Science gives firms a quick “glimpse of the possible”
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2004,  p. 912), allowing alternative prob-
lems and solutions to  be  evaluated via an ‘offline’ search process
(Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Lippman and McCall, 1976; Nelson,
1959). For instance, the invention of photonic-crystal fibers – a
new class of optical fibers – was  developed through the transfer
of knowledge from the principles of quantum mechanics to the
field of optics, and built on the theoretical idea that light could
be trapped in  photonics ‘bandgaps’ in  a similar way  to how elec-
trons can be trapped in the energy gaps of a  lattice (Benabid, 2006;
Russell, 2003). Because scientific knowledge improves firms’ ability
to comprehend, assimilate and recombine knowledge from more
distant domains (Gambardella, 1995; Gruber et al., 2013), the dis-
tance of an invention’s variations that can be  identified by relying
on scientific knowledge is likely to increase. Thus:
Hypothesis 2b. The greater the firm’s scientific knowledge, the
greater the number of technological classes its patent claims will
be classified in.
2.3.2. Related inventive experience and patent scope
Firms can also develop general knowledge schemes from
their actual engagement with concrete experiences (Arora and
Gambardella, 1994a; Cattani, 2005; Fosfuri and Tribo’, 2008;
Gavetti et al., 2005; Hofstadter, 2001; Levinthal and March, 1993;
Levinthal, 1995). When similar problems are encountered several
times, firms are  likely to derive general schemas for understand-
ing and solving problems of that  nature, which are then stored in
their knowledge bases (Gick and Holyoak, 1980; Hofstadter, 2001).
Such schemas, and the settings they are derived from, then serve
to  identify candidate solutions for the new technological problems
they face (Gavetti et al., 2005; Gick and Holyoak, 1980; Hofstadter,
2001; Holyoak and Thagard, 1989).
Relatedness in the experience accumulated by a  firm increases
the likelihood that a  connection between prior experience and a
current problem can be identified (Gentner and Landers, 1985;
Gick and Holyoak, 1980; Holyoak and Thagard, 1989), as well as
the repertoire of potential solutions for that problem (e.g. Cattani,
2005; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). For  instance, Corning’s prior
inventive experience in lasers, glass manufacturing and integrated
circuits helped the company identify specific solutions to  develop-
ing the first optical fibers (Cattani, 2006). This will facilitate the
identification of useful variations to the invention’s ‘best mode’
and, consequently, increase the number of claimed variations the
inventing firm can incorporate in  its patent documents. Hence:
Hypothesis 3a. The greater the firm’s related inventive experi-
ence, the greater the number of claims in its patents.
However, relatedness in  the firm’s inventive experience is  likely
to reduce the distance between the variations identified. First, the
relatedness of source settings can lead to an increase in similarity
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between the possible responses identified in the first place. Sec-
ond, more experience in certain domains might create a  form
of “cognitive myopia” toward more distant domains (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990, 1994; Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1988).
Third, related experiences are likely to  share many contextual
elements, hence the generality of the maps and structures of
phenomena derived from it – and the degree to which such maps
can be effective as guides to approaching more distant contexts –
might be lower (Hofstadter, 2001; Holland et al., 1989; Newell and
Simon, 1972).
At the same time, past exploitation in  a  certain domain makes
future exploitation within that same domain even more efficient, so
increasing the opportunity cost of exploration beyond that domain,
and reducing the incentives to  explore more widely (Levinthal and
March, 1993). Hence, the greater the level of related inventive expe-
rience in a firm’s knowledge base, the less likely it is that it will
engage in a broader search for variations to an invention, and thus:
Hypothesis 3b. The greater the firm’s related inventive expe-
rience, the lower the number of technological classes its patent
claims will be classified in.
3. Empirical context, methods and measures
3.1. Photonics
The empirical analysis is  conducted on firms active in the
photonics arena. Photonics is the technology of generating and har-
nessing light and other forms of radiant energy whose quantum
unit is the photon (The Photonics Directory, 2014). The word ‘pho-
tonics’ appeared in the late 1960s to describe a research field whose
goal was to use light to perform functions that typically fell within
the electronics domain, such as telecommunications and informa-
tion processing. The broad span of photonics’ applications ranges
from energy generation to  detection, communications and infor-
mation processing, and includes technologies for the generation,
emission, transmission, modulation, signal processing, switching,
amplification and detection or sensing of light.
Both scientific and technical knowledge are important in this
field. The basic scientific knowledge underlying photonics draws
from physics and engineering, but a broad range of scientific knowl-
edge bases are used within the field, including chemicals, material
science, astronomy, optics and electronics. The photonics indus-
try includes both small and large firms – specialized players as
well as generalists. Firms’ inventive experience also varies in this
industry, because photonics components and products are used in
multiple applications, such as material processing, signal analy-
sis, imaging. During the period covered by the current study the
field was known for its level of innovation (Stuck, 1998; Teich and
Saleh, 1991). Patenting inventions is  a  common practice in  pho-
tonics (Fearnside, 2007)  and the question of the scope of patents is
particularly meaningful in  this field, where the level of standard-
ization is low for many technologies – hence firms have greater
freedom in choosing how to address each technological problem
they face. Detailed information about the industry was  collected
from a set of fifteen interviews with industry experts, photonics
scientists and academics, and patent attorneys in the United States
and Europe. The qualitative data collected during these interviews
were also used to  validate the theory and the operationalization of
the constructs developed in  this study, as well as to  support the
interpretation of its results.
3.2. Sample and data
To test the hypotheses, I  built a  longitudinal data set contain-
ing information about a sample of photonics firms over a ten-year
period (1993–2002). To define photonics and its boundaries I relied
on an industry directory (The Photonics Directory, by Laurin Pub-
lishing), which lists all companies active in  photonics’ subfields. I
selected all U.S. companies listed in the directory between 1993
and 2002, and extracted information on their key characteristics
(e.g., independence status, size, age, location) for each year. The
sample included both private and public firms, and so is  generally
representative of the different categories of firms active in  high-
technology contexts. It  also included firms that entered or exited
the industry during the period, limiting any survival bias.
I  used firms’ names and locations and matched them to patent
assignee’s names in the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) patents database. The NBER data set provides patent data
consolidated at the parent portfolio level for public firms. For pri-
vate firms, I used the D&B Who  Owns Whom database to build a  list
of their worldwide subsidiaries for each year of the study. I then
matched this list with the NBER data set to obtain the list of patents
filed by each of the firm’s subsidiaries, and finally, consolidated the
list of patents at the parent firm level. This procedure resulted in
the selection of 88,528 patents, held by 656 firms.
3.3. Variable definitions and operationalization
3.3.1. Number of variations to the invention and their positioning
across technological domains
In the theory section of this paper I identified two core dimen-
sions defining patent scope, i.e.  the number of variations to an
invention and the positioning of those variations across multiple
technological classes. Following existing research, I  operational-
ized the first dimension as the number of claims in  the patent
(i.e. Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997; Merges and Nelson, 1994;
Walker, 1995), information which I collected from the NBER patent
dataset. I collected (from Google Patents) the number of unique
three-digit technological classes in  which each patent’s claims were
classified at the time of the patent application as reflecting the
positioning of those claims across technological classes (USPTO,
2014b). I computed this measure using the USPTO patent classi-
fication, which provides two  benefits relative to  the International
Patent Classification (IPC). First, it only classifies patents accord-
ing to their claims – rather than considering the complete patent
documentation (Gruber et al., 2013; USPTO, 2014b) – and, sec-
ond, it emphasizes an invention’s technical focus as opposed to  its
industrial uses (Lerner, 1994; USPTO, 2014b). Hence, the USPTO
classification is  appropriate to study how a  firm’s knowledge base
leads to the development of the technical knowledge embodied in
its patent claims.
3.3.2. Forward self-citations
Consistent with previous research, I  used the total number of
forward self-citations a patent receives as a  measure of the ability of
the inventing firm to internalize and build on its early knowledge
(e.g. Hall et al., 2005).  As forward citations are  subject to trun-
cation issues, I calculated this measure using two alternative time
windows, i.e. a  fixed four-year time window from the year of  the
patent grant, and the full time window from the date of the patent
grant through to  2006. These windows are shorter than the full
patent term, so the forward citations I considered occurred while
the patent rights were still valid, allowing me to investigate the
extent to  which a patent’s scope was  effective in protecting the
knowledge embodied in its claims from spilling over to other firms.
3.3.3. Scientific knowledge and related inventive experience
I referred to the characteristics of a  firm’s patents from year
t −  5 to t − 1 (where t is the year of the focal patent application)
as indirect indicators of the characteristics of its knowledge base
in the years before that application (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001;
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Argote, 1999; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002). The construct of scien-
tific knowledge refers to the influence of science in the invention
process. Previous studies have emphasized that references to sci-
entific articles provide a  reasonable indicator of the influence of
science on the inventive process (Brusoni et al., 2005; Fleming and
Sorenson, 2004; Narin et al., 1997; Tijssen, 2001). To measure this
construct, I  used the proportion of patents in the firm’s knowledge
base prior to year t which cited scientific articles to the total num-
ber of its patents. As a  robustness check, I also calculated the total
number of references to scientific articles in  the firm’s patents prior
to year t. To calculate these variables I collected the full text of non-
patent references in the firm’s patents from the Patent Data Verse
database (Lai et al., 2011)  and then selected only the references to
scientific articles using a combination of a  search algorithm and
manual checks.
The construct of prior related inventive experience,  in  contrast,
pertains to the amount of experience in  a  firm’s knowledge base
related to the focal invention. To assess whether a patent in the
firm’s portfolio was related to the focal patent, I  used the classifi-
cation developed by  Hall et al. (2001), who reclassified the main
USPTO three-digit patent classes into a  set of two-digit technologi-
cal subcategories, based on the extent to which they relate to each
other. I calculated this measure as the proportion of patents that
were assigned to  a  primary technological class related to that of
the focal patent to  the total number of patents the firm applied for
in the years prior to year t. As a  robustness check, I also calculated
this measure as the total number of related patents applied by the
firm in the years prior to t.
3.3.4. Controls
The analyses controlled for firm size, i.e.  the number of its
employees in year t,  firm age, i.e. the number of years elapsed from
its establishment to year t, and firm’s knowledge stock, i.e. the num-
ber of patents for which it had applied over the five years before
year t. To control for firms’ differential ability to  leverage their
prior experience in  the inventive process, I  included the variable
knowledge leverage, i.e. the proportion of self-citations over the total
number of backward citations appearing in the firm’s patents dur-
ing years t − 1 to t −  5 (adapted to  the context of this study from the
leverage measure used by  Cattani, 2005). I included controls for the
novelty of the technology, as the exploration of novel technolog-
ical areas offers firms opportunities to  preempt a  higher number
of ‘spots’ in the inventive space with variations to  their inventions,
leading to the identification of a  higher number of claims. Such
claims could potentially be assigned to multiple technology classes,
due to lack of established technological knowledge to guide the
patent examiners (e.g. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie,
2000). But, when the technology underlying the invention is more
novel, the number and diversity of variations to  an invention may
be lower, due to  the fact that more novel contexts are character-
ized by greater uncertainty, and most of the connections with other
technological domains will still be unknown.
To capture – at the patent level  – the extent to which the firm
had developed the patent by elaborating on established versus
more recent knowledge, I introduced the variable technological
novelty, i.e. the inverse of the median age in  years of the patent’s
backward citations (Oriani and Sobrero, 2008). I  also included
technology life cycle fixed effects for each technological domain.
Each technology life cycleij fixed effect equals 1 if the patent appli-
cation year equals i and the technology class of the patent equals
j, (with i  = 1. . .I, and j =  1. . .J,  where I equals 10 years in the sample
and J equals 410 technology classes represented in  the sample
specified at the three-digit US classification level), and 0 otherwise.
To control for any remaining source of unobserved heterogeneity
I included firm and industry subfield fixed effects in the analysis.
Table 2 shows the variables and descriptive statistics, and Table 3
shows the correlations between the main variables in the analysis.
3.4. Model estimation and econometric issues
I  use a  linear regression model at the patent level  of  analysis
to test Hypothesis 1,  where I estimate the number of self-citations
received by a patent as a function of the number of claims, the num-
ber of classes, a  set of control variables (firm scientific knowledge,
firm related inventive experience,  firm knowledge stock,  technologi-
cal  novelty,  firm size, firm age, firm knowledge leverage, total forward
citation) and firm-, subfield and technology life cycle – fixed effects.
To test Hypotheses 2a, 3a, 2b and 3b I use two linear regression
models at the patent level where the dependent variables are,
respectively, patent claims and patent classes. These variables are
estimated as a  function of the firm’s scientific knowledge, firm related
inventive experience,  the control variables (firm knowledge stock,
technological novelty, firm size,  firm age, firm knowledge leverage)
and firm-subfield and technology life cycle-fixed effects. In  the linear
regression models, I took the natural logarithm of all the variables
on the right and left hand sides of the equations to address any
skewness in  the data.
4. Estimation results and robustness checks
4.1. Patent scope and self-citations
Table 4 reports the result of the models in which the dependent
variable is  the number of self-citations a patent receives. Model
4.1 is  the baseline model and includes all the control variables.
The two  independent variables, i.e. number of claims and number of
classes, are added separately in  Models 4.2 and 4.3, while Model 4.4
includes them both. Results from the full model (4.4) show that the
number of self-citations a  patent receives is  positively associated
with the number of claims in  it (  ˇ = 0.014; p <  0.01), but is  nega-
tively associated with the number of patent classes it is assigned
to (  ˇ = −0.020; p  < 0.01): these results support Hypothesis 1.  This
implies that, at the sample mean of both the dependent and the
independent variables, an increase of one standard deviation in the
number of claims in  a  patent is associated with an increase of  2.8%
in the number of self-citations, and, conversely, an increase of  one
standard deviation in the number of classes is associated with a
decrease in  the number of self-citations of 2.75%. These effects are
highly significant, even though their magnitude is not very large. It
must be taken into account that the effects are estimated at the indi-
vidual patent level, and so may  have greater economic significance
for firms holding large portfolios of patents. In addition, it is  impor-
tant to recognize that the economic value of inventions building on
a  firm’s patents is  not linearly related to  their number: even a  few
very successful follow-up inventions can contribute considerably
to a firm’s economic performance.
To check the robustness of these results, I  have run several alter-
native models. First, in Model 4.5, I replicated the same analyses on
a  subsample of patents in photonics technological classes only.4
4 The USPTO classification does not  include a  specific class for photonics patents. I
relied on the assumption that if photonics firms had the same probability of patent-
ing in any US patent class as all  other firms, the  proportion of patents applied in
each class by  photonics firms to the total number of patents they applied for should
(in principle) be equal to the proportion of patents applied in that class by all firms
in the NBER database to the total number of patents applied across all classes by all
firms in the NBER database. However, if these two proportions differed (with the
first  proportion being higher) this could be interpreted as indicating that photonics
firms had an higher propensity to patent in that class  compared to other firms in the
NBER database, and that that class was particularly relevant to the photonics indus-
try.  I referred to  the non-consolidated sample of corporate entities directly active in
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Table  2
Descriptive statistics.
Description Obs Mean S.D. Min  Max
Patent scope
Number of claims Patent level. Number of claims in the patent 88,528 15.516 11.881 1.000 318.000
Number of classes Patent level. Number of unique technological
classes in which the claims of the patent are
classified
88,528 1.577 0.831 1.000 10.000
Antecedents
Firm  scientific knowledge
(from t −  5 to t − 1)
Firm-year level. Number of patents applied by
the firm in years from t −  5  to t  −  1 citing
scientific articles over the total number of
patents applied by  the firm in years from t − 5
to  t − 1
88,528 0.077 0.062 0.000 1.000
Firm  related inventive
experience (from t − 5 to
t − 1)
Firm-year-technology level. Number of patents
in  technological classes related to  the one of
the  focal patent applied by the firm in years
from t − 5 to t − 1 over the total number of
patents applied by  the firm in years from t − 5
to  t − 1
88,528 0.141 0.158 0.000 1.000
Implications
Self-forward citations
(from t to t  + 4)
Patent level. Number of self-citations received
by the patent from t (time of the patent grant)
to  t +  4
88,528 0.620 1.980 0.000 54.000
Total forward citations
(from t to t  + 4)
Patent level. Number of total forward citations
received  by  the patent from t (time of the
patent grant) to t +  4
88,528 4.857 7.843 0.000 176.000
Controls
Firm knowledge stock
(from t −  5 to t − 1)
Firm-year level. Number of patents applied by
the firm in the  years from t  − 5 to  t  − 1
88,528 3185.358 2416.666 0.500 9764.874
Technological novelty Patent level. Inverse of the median age (in
years) of the patent’s backward citations
88,528 0.605 0.227 0.056 1.000
Firm  size Firm-year level. Number of employees in year t 88,528 3933.585 14,127.840 2.000 480,000.000
Firm  age Firm-year level. Number of years elapsed from
the firm’s establishment to year t
88,528 60.710 32.212 1.000 180.000
Firm knowledge leverage Firm-year level. Number of backward citations
made  by the firm to  its own patents (in the
patents applied by  the firm in years from t − 5
to  t − 1)  over  the total number of backward
citations  appearing in the patents applied by
the  firm in years from t −  5  to t  −  1
88,528 0.125 0.079 0.000 0.600
Table 3
Pairwise correlations between variables (N =  88,528).a
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10 11
1. Number of claims 1.000
2.  Number of classes 0.030 1.000
3.  Firm scientific knowledge (from t − 5 to t − 1)  0.115 0.060 1.000
4.  Firm related inventive experience (from t  − 5 to  t − 1) 0.091 −0.073 0.056 1.000
5.  Self-forward citations (from t to t +  4)  0.085 0.002 0.026 0.063 1.000
6.  Total forward citations (from t to t  +  4)  0.110 0.048 0.103 0.007 0.432 1.000
7.  Firm knowledge stock (from t − 5  to  t  − 1) −0.107 −0.070 −0.166 −0.219 −0.069 −0.105 1.000
8.  Technological novelty −0.036 −0.010 −0.045 0.016 0.048 0.007 −0.161 1.000
9.  Firm size −0.002 0.020 0.026 −0.034 0.046 0.026  −0.013 0.073 1.000
10.  Firm age −0.037 −0.003 −0.109 −0.185 0.032 −0.026 0.091  0.072 0.222 1.000
11.  Firm knowledge leverage −0.071 −0.003 −0.199 −0.063 0.094 −0.029 0.140  0.066 0.026 0.374 1.000
a Correlation coefficients with absolute value greater than 0.003 are  significant at the 95% level; correlation coefficients with absolute value greater than 0.007 are significant
at  the 99% level.
photonics and identified the set of three-digit primary US technological classes in
which these companies patented. For each technological class j identified in the non-
consolidated sample, I calculated the proportion of patents in that class to  the total
number of patents in the sample across all J  classes,
(
nPHj/
∑J
j=1
nPHj
)
in the period
under consideration. I calculated the same proportion using all patents in the NBER
database,
(
nNBERj/
∑J
j=1
nNBERj
)
, referring to the same set of classes J  in the same
period). I then compared these two  proportions, using  a  z test to assess whether the
difference between them was statistically significant. I retained in the sample all  the
classes that satisfied two  conditions: (1) nPHj/
∑J
j=1
nPHj > nNBERj/
∑J
j=1
nNBERj;  (2)
the difference was statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. This  procedure
resulted in the selection of 74  classes (details available on  request).
Second, Model 4.6 reports the results of the analyses conducted
using the full time window available after the patent grant to  cal-
culate the number of forward citations patents received.5 Third,
5 For comparison purposes, in Model 4.7 I use the number of external citations
received by  a  patent as the dependent variable. Consistent with the theory developed
in this paper, the results show that an  increase in patent claims is associated with a
decrease in the number of external forward citations received by the patent, while
an  increase in the number of patent classes is  associated with an increase in the
number  of external citations it received. Model 4.8 considers the total number of
forward  citations received by  the patent as the dependent variable, and the  results
show that both claims and classes are  positively associated with it.
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Table  4
Linear regression estimates of patents’ self-forward citations.a
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Sample  All patents,
four year
window from
patent grant
date
All patents,
four year
window from
patent grant
date
All patents,
four year
window from
patent grant
date
All patents,
four year
window from
patent grant
date
Photonics
patents, four
year window
from patent
grant date
All patents, full
window from
patent grant
date
All patents, full
window from
patent grant
date
All patents, full
window from
patent grant
date
Variables Ln(1 +  self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 + self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 +  self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 +  self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1  +  self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 +  self-
forward
citations)
Ln(1 + external
forward
citations)
Ln(1 + total
forward
citations)
Ln(number of claims)
0.014*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.020*** −0.004*** 0.126***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Ln(number of classes)
−0.019*** −0.020*** −0.015*** −0.017*** 0.015*** 0.111***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007)
Ln(1 + firm scientific
knowledge)
−0.530*** −0.540*** −0.528*** −0.537*** −0.683*** −0.689*** 0.131*** −0.279*
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.114) (0.096) (0.046) (0.146)
Ln(1 + firm rel. inv.
experience)
0.300*** 0.298*** 0.294*** 0.293*** 0.252*** 0.336*** −0.151*** 0.111***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.022) (0.012) (0.037)
Ln(1 + firm knowledge
stock)
−0.063*** −0.065*** −0.063*** −0.065*** −0.050*** −0.056*** 0.029*** −0.098***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.017)
Ln(1 + technological
novelty)
0.039*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.052*** 0.031** −0.021*** −0.075***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.008) (0.024)
Ln(firm size)
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.004 0.005** −0.006*** −0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Ln(firm age)
0.059 0.061 0.059 0.060 −0.006 0.004 −0.034 −0.198***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.061) (0.044) (0.024) (0.072)
Ln(1 + firm knowledge
leverage)
−1.239*** −1.230*** −1.237*** −1.227*** −1.560*** −1.387*** 0.257*** −1.509***
(0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.208) (0.157) (0.087) (0.247)
Ln(1 + total forward
citations)
0.257*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 0.256*** 0.218*** 0.280*** 0.932***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Subfield fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Technology life cycle
fixed effects
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant
−0.198 −0.390** −0.354** −0.385** 0.000 −0.417** 0.178** 1.526***
(0.169) (0.162) (0.162) (0.162) (0.241) (0.180) (0.090) (0.274)
Observations 88,528 88,528 88,528 88,528 51,156 88,528 88,528 88,528
R-squared 0.370 0.371 0.370 0.371 0.327 0.382 0.934 0.347
a Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
because many patents receive zero self-citations, in the linear
regression models I used a  log-transformed measure of the depend-
ent variable plus 1. To control for the robustness of the results
against the use of this transformation, I replicated the analyses
using two additional models. First, I considered the count of self-
forward citations as the dependent variable in a Negative Binomial
regression model with robust standard errors (reported in  Table 5,
Model 5.1). Second, in  Model 5.2, I  considered the proportion of self-
forward citations to  the total number of forward citations received
by the patent as an alternative dependent variable, and estimated
the results using a fractional logit regression model (Papke and
Wooldridge, 1996). The results of all these alternative specifications
support the results reported in Table 4.
4.2. Scientific knowledge, related inventive experience and patent
scope
Table 6 reports the estimation results of the models in which the
number of claims in  the patent is  a  function of firm scientific knowl-
edge and related inventive experience (and other control variables).
Specifically, Model 6.1 includes the control variables only, and Mod-
els 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 add  the independent variables sequentially.
The estimates in the full model (6.4) suggest that  both scientific
knowledge and related inventive experience are positively associ-
ated with the number of claims included in  the patent (  ˇ =  0.663,
p < 0.01;  ˇ = 0.065, p  <  0.05, respectively), supporting Hypotheses 2a
and 3a.  Hence, at the sample mean of both the dependent and the
independent variables, an increase of one standard deviation in
the level of the firm’s scientific knowledge is  associated with an
increase of 3.8% in the number of patent claims, while an increase
of one standard deviation in the level of related inventive experi-
ence is associated with an increase of 0.90% in  the number of claims
in  a  patent.
Table 7 reports the results of the model specifications in which
the number of patent classes are estimated as a  function of  firm
scientific knowledge and related inventive experience. Model 7.1
reports the control variables only and models 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 add
the independent variables sequentially. The coefficients in the full
model (7.4) show that the number of patent classes is positively
associated with scientific knowledge (  ˇ =  0.155, p <  0.05), but neg-
atively associated with related inventive experience (  ˇ =  −0.271,
p <  0.01), results which support Hypotheses 2b and 3b.  The esti-
mates imply that, at the sample mean of both the dependent and
independent variables, an increase of one standard deviation in the
level of scientific knowledge is associated with an increase in the
number of classes of 0.89% compared to the average value. In con-
trast, an increase of one standard deviation in the level  of related
inventive experience at the mean value of the sample is associated
with a  decrease of 3.75% in  the number of classes in  a patent, com-
pared to the average value. Once again, these effects are calculated
at the level of the individual patent, and so might be more relevant
for firms that hold large patents portfolios.
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Table  5
Negative binomial and fractional logit regression estimates of patents’ self-forward citations.a
5.1 5.2
Negative binomial regression Fractional logit regression
Sample All  patents, four year window from  patent grant date All patents, full window from patent grant date
Variables Self-forward citations Proportion of self-forward citations to total forward citations
Ln(number of claims)
0.043*** 0.043***
(0.010) (0.013)
Ln(number of classes)
−0.081*** −0.132***
(0.017) (0.022)
Ln(1 + firm scientific
knowledge)
−1.030*** −1.191**
(0.349) (0.469)
Ln(1 + firm rel. inv.
experience)
1.291*** 1.520***
(0.089) (0.120)
Ln(1 + firm knowledge
stock)
−0.349*** −0.411***
(0.037) (0.050)
Ln(1 + technological
novelty)
0.207*** 0.151**
(0.054) (0.074)
Ln(firm size)
0.051*** 0.053***
(0.008) (0.010)
Ln(firm age)
0.382*** 0.689***
(0.142) (0.206)
Ln(1 + firm knowledge
leverage)
0.059 −0.706
(0.480) (0.687)
Ln(1 + total forward
citations)
1.288***
(0.008)
Firm fixed effects Included Included
Subfield fixed effects Included Included
Time fixed effectsb Included Included
Technology fixed effectsb Included Included
Constant
−5.240*** −3.226***
(0.897) (1.033)
Observations 88,528 66,687
Log likelihood −64,950.284 −20,259.79781
a Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
b These models did not converge when the technology lifecycle fixed effects were included. Hence, to control for time- and technology-class level unobserved heterogeneity
these  models include time- and technology class-fixed effects (specified at the three-digit US classification level).
To  test the robustness of these results, I replicated the analyses
described in Tables 6 and 7 on a subsample of patents in  pho-
tonics technological classes (see note 4) in models 6.5 and 7.5,
respectively. In models 6.6 and 7.6, respectively, I replicate the
analyses using the alternative measures for the core independent
variables. The robustness of these results should also be evaluated
against possible alternative explanations. One such explanation is
that firms’ knowledge bases and patenting behaviors might be char-
acterized by patterns specific to certain technological classes, and
not related to the mechanisms outlined in the hypotheses. How-
ever, the use of both firm and technological life cycle fixed effects
in the analyses mitigates this risk. A second potential alternative
explanation is that firms that have unrelated experience include
‘unrelated’ knowledge inputs in their patents’ claims – material
that is only loosely connected to the invention – and so they are
eventually assigned to  more different technological classifications.
However, this alternate explanation was ruled out by the inter-
views conducted with the patent attorneys, who explained that,
while inventors have the incentive to  increase the number of claims
in their patent applications, if the claims did not reflect ‘mean-
ingful’ variations to the invention, they would be rejected by the
patent examiners, delaying the overall patenting process and hence
generating substantial losses for those inventors.
5.  Discussion and conclusions
5.1. Core findings, previous research and implications for future
research
This paper makes four contributions to  the literature on patent
scope. First, while most of the prior literature in this area has
focused on the changes to  the size of the inventive area covered
by the patent rights determined by patent policy (e.g. Cohen and
Lemley, 2001; Denicolo’, 1996; Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Green
and Scotchmer, 1995; Kitch, 1977; Klemperer, 1990; Merges and
Nelson, 1990, 1994; Scotchmer, 1991), this paper suggests that the
scope of patents also depends on firms’ ability to identify a  higher
number of variations to their inventions that they can include in
their patent claims. From a policy standpoint, this consideration
implies that changes in  the level of the regulator’s leniency in  the
examination of inventions will not have the same impact for all
inventing firms, as prior research has assumed. For instance, firms
with low ability to  identify variations to their inventions will not
benefit much if the regulator applied greater tolerance in accept-
ing patent claims. In contrast, a  reduction in the regulator’s leniency
would penalize firms with greater ability to  identify variations to
their inventions more than firms with lesser ability to do  so. It
would be interesting for future research to  investigate how this
may  affect the expected levels of social welfare.
Second, this paper shows that the extent to which the inven-
tive firm itself builds on  the knowledge underlying its patents is
lower when its claims span across multiple technological classes.
This allows us to better qualify the fundamental assumption of the
existing literature – that broader scope is associated with a greater
protection for the inventing firm (e.g. Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990;
Kitch, 1977; Klemperer, 1990). Identifying claims falling across
multiple classes might not necessarily provide the inventing firm
with an advantage, as it might lead it to reveal connections of the
inventive idea across a  broader set of domains, while finding that
it lacked the complementary capabilities, resources or the span of
attention to  pursue all those opportunities itself.
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Table  6
Linear regression estimate of patents’ claims.a
6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear regression Linear
regression
All  patents All patents All patents All patents Photonics patents All patents
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(number of
claims)
Ln(1 + firm scientific knowledge)
0.659*** 0.663*** 0.552***
(0.137) (0.137) (0.170)
Ln(1 + firm related inventive
experience)
0.063* 0.065** 0.210***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.044)
Ln(1 + firm scientific knowledge,
alternative measure)
0.100***
(0.012)
Ln(1 + firm related inventive,
alternative measure)
0.011***
(0.003)
Ln(1 + firm knowledge stock)
0.169*** 0.162*** 0.168*** 0.161*** 0.208*** 0.066***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
Ln(1 + technological novelty)
−0.056*** −0.056*** −0.056*** −0.056*** −0.084*** −0.057***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.021)
Ln(firm size)
−0.011*** −0.012*** −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.008* −0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Ln(firm age)
−0.102 −0.098 −0.100 −0.095 −0.130 −0.071
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.098) (0.069)
Ln(1 + firm knowledge leverage)
−0.983*** −0.794*** −0.992*** −0.802*** −1.434*** −0.589***
(0.212) (0.216) (0.212) (0.217) (0.290) (0.218)
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Subfield fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Technology life cycle fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant
2.388*** 2.382*** 2.373*** 2.367*** 2.119*** 2.572***
(0.272) (0.272) (0.272) (0.273) (0.382) (0.273)
Observations 88,528 88,528 88,528 88,528 51,156 88,528
R-squared 0.163 0.164 0.163 0.164 0.148 0.164
a Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 7
Linear regression estimates of patents’ classes.a
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear
regression
Linear regression Linear
regression
All  patents All patents All patents All patents Photonics patents All patents
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(number of
classes)
Ln(1 + firm scientific knowledge)
0.172** 0.155** 0.223**
(0.078) (0.078) (0.092)
Ln(1  + firm related inventive
experience)
−0.272*** −0.271*** −0.238***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.025)
Ln(1  + firm scientific knowledge,
alternative measure)
0.018***
(0.007)
Ln(1 + firm related inventive,
alternative measure)
−0.034***
(0.002)
Ln(1 + firm knowledge stock)
0.002 −0.000 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Ln(1 + technological novelty)
−0.029** −0.028** −0.027** −0.027** −0.005 −0.024**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012)
Ln(firm size)
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Ln(firm age)
−0.020 −0.018 −0.030 −0.029 −0.054 −0.021
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.055) (0.040)
Ln(1 + firm knowledge leverage)
0.012 0.061 0.050 0.095 0.281* 0.083
(0.128) (0.130) (0.127) (0.130) (0.164) (0.131)
Firm fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Subfield fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Technology life cycle fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant
0.285* 0.284* 0.349** 0.347** 0.928*** 0.264
(0.168) (0.168) (0.169) (0.169) (0.211) (0.168)
Observations 88,528 88,528 88,528 88,528 51,156 88,528
R-squared 0.205 0.205 0.207 0.207 0.170 0.208
a Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Third, this paper investigates the antecedents of patent scope,
thus complementing prior research which has largely focused on
its implications (e.g. Dechenaux et al., 2008; Gambardella and
Giarratana, 2013; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1997; Lerner, 1994;
Shane, 2001). It  suggests that firms’ incentives to  invest in some fac-
tors – such as scientific knowledge – that strengthen the protection
provided by the patent by increasing the number of patent claims
may  be mixed, because such investments also increase the chances
that those claims span multiple domains, an outcome that might
increase knowledge spill-overs to other firms. Nevertheless, some
firms might still be willing to develop patents spanning multiple
domains, as it must be recognized that inventions by  other firms
that build on a focal firm’s knowledge might not  always constitute
a bad outcome for the focal firm. For instance, Belenzon (2012)
suggests that firms are sometimes able to reabsorb their spilled
knowledge in subsequent periods, together with knowledge about
the developments made by  external inventors: this can act as a
mechanism to help them escape the no-growth trap and achieve
long term returns. In  addition, inventions spawned by  others might
complement the original invention (Ahuja et al., 2013; Walsh et al.,
2003).
Finally, this paper provides a  new reflection on the operational-
ization of the construct of patent scope. While prior research in
this area has used both patent claims and patent classes as alter-
native measures of patent scope (e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman,
1997, 2004; Lerner, 1994; Merges and Nelson, 1994; Shane, 2001),
this study suggests that, rather, they reflect different dimensions.
Claims reflect the number of variations identified to an initial core
invention; classes reflect the extent to  which these variations are
spread out in the technological space. The results of this study shed
new light on the interpretation of previous empirical results that
have used the number of technological classes in  which the patent
claims are classified as a measure of patent scope. For example,
prior studies show that broader patent scope (measured as the
number of IPC classes) is  associated with a  higher likelihood that a
licensed invention will be commercialized as a product (Dechenaux
et al., 2008), or by  the establishment of a new firm (Shane, 2001).
Along the same line of reasoning, Nerkar and Shane’s (2003) results
show that start-ups that have their patents classified in a higher
number of classes are less likely to fail, although this effect is
reduced in more concentrated industries, where the possession
of marketing and manufacturing agreements are relatively more
important to firm’s survival. In a  similar vein, Lerner (1994) pre-
dicts and shows that broader scope is  positively associated with
the  valuations placed on firms during the venture capital invest-
ment process. On  the contrary, Harhoff et al. (2003) investigate the
relationship between the number of IPC classes in which a  patent is
classified and the patent’s value, measured through a  self-assessed
measure (‘how much did the patent contribute to the future pro-
fitability of the enterprise’), and find that the relationship between
these two variables is  consistently insignificant across all specifi-
cations.
These prior studies have built on the theoretical intuition
that patents with broader scope should enjoy stronger protec-
tion against the risk of imitation. However, the results from this
paper emphasize that, holding constant the number of claims,
when the scope of patents spans multiple classes, firms’ ability
to build on them compared to other firms is lower; this might
potentially even reduce the likelihood of the focal firm success-
fully commercializing the invention, in that other firms might have
superior ability to build on that invention relative to the focal firm.
Further, follow-up inventions may  potentially be substitutes to
the original ones: at the invention level, this might reduce the
incentive to engage in the commercialization of the invention,
while at the firm level, this might increase the hazard of firm fail-
ure.
Re-examining prior empirical research results by taking these
considerations into account opens up many possible research
avenues. Despite the value of these contributions in advancing our
understanding of the role of patent scope at the invention and firm
levels, the operationalizations employed by prior research have two
main limitations. First, they do  not consider that – holding the num-
ber of classes in  which a patent is classified constant – the number of
patent claims can vary. Second, in  measuring the number of  patent
classes, prior studies have mostly used the IPC classification, which
considers the complete technological information contained in the
patent documentation (Gruber et al., 2013; USPTO, 2014b), rather
than only the information contained in  the patent claims, and so
does not distinguish between patents that are  classified in multi-
ple classes because they build on  diverse knowledge inputs (e.g.
patents with higher technological diversity, as in Guellec and van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2000, 2002), and ones that generate
new knowledge that refers to  different domains (i.e. closer to the
theoretical definitions of patent scope).
Once we recognize this more nuanced picture, additional mech-
anisms emerge to explain the positive associations found by  prior
studies, beyond those to which past research has attributed the
relationships. For instance, having patents classified in a higher
number of classes may  be associated with higher chances of a  start-
up surviving because it might be indicative of the fact that it has
been able to develop a  technology that  is potentially applicable in
more domains, which may  be particularly helpful in the event that
the original idea does not succeed (e.g. Gruber et al., 2008). A firm’
ability to signal the broader applicability of its technology in the
patent document itself might even yield a  premium to its valuation
by venture capitalists, who typically assess firm potential.
Similarly, in interpreting the insignificance of their results,
Harhoff et al. (2003) provide a  set of possible explanations such
as the single- versus multi-industry approach or the potential dif-
ference between the US and German Patent Offices. In addition to
those explanations, the evidence in  the present paper suggests that
the two dimensions of scope (i.e. patent claims and patent classes)
might not co-vary perfectly; hence, distinguishing between them
could lead to  qualitatively different conclusions about the effect
of patent scope on patent value. If patents classified into more
classes were distributed between those that had many claims per
class and others that had relatively few claims per class in  the
sample observed by Harhoff et al. (2003), one could observe a  non-
significant effect of more classes on patent value as they indeed
found. The former group of patents would contribute to  private
value (the outcome that Harhoff et al. (2003) examined), but  the
latter would not.  While the authors acknowledge the lack of  patent
claims among the controls as a  limitation, the results from my study
suggest that adding a  control for patent claims might clarify our
understanding of this relationship substantially.
5.2. Limitations
Finally, I acknowledge that there are some limitations to  the
study. First, the empirical test is  based on a  sample of patents
developed by firms operating in the photonics industry. Although
photonics shares many features with other high-tech industries,
and the sample selected presents variety in  the characteristics of
the firms it includes, it would be  interesting for future research
to  verify the consistency of these results across different settings.
Second, in investigating the implications of patent scope, this paper
focuses only on one performance dimension, i.e. a firm’s ability in
building on the knowledge underlying its patent. It would be inter-
esting for future research to investigate other dimensions of firm
performance more closely, making a  distinction between the two
dimensions of patents scope identified in this paper. A first step in
this direction has been made by research that has investigated the
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relationship between patent scope and patent litigations. Within
this stream, Lerner (1994) finds that the number of classes into
which a patent is classified increases the chance that the patent
is litigated, when the number of patent claims is not included as
a control variable. Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997) estimate the
probability of litigation as a  function of the number of classes and
the number of claims and, while they find that litigated patents
have higher numbers of claims, they do not find a positive associ-
ation between the number of patent classes and the probability of
litigation. This suggests that considering the distinction between
patent claims and patent classes in determining the strength of
patent protection might lead to a better understanding of the
results prior research has obtained in this area.
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